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Developing economiesThe permanent income hypothesis implies that frictionless open economies with exhaustible natural resources
should save abroad most of their resource windfalls and, therefore, feature current account surpluses. Resource
rich developing countries (RRDCs), on the other hand, face substantial development needs and tight external
borrowing constraints. By relaxing these constraints and providing a key ﬁnancing source for public investment,
resource windfalls might then be associated with current account deﬁcits or at least low surpluses. In this paper,
we develop a neoclassical model with private and public investment and several pervasive features in RRDCs, in-
cluding absorptive capacity constraints, inefﬁciencies in investment, borrowing constraints, and capital scarcity.
We use the model to study the role of investment and these frictions in shaping the current account dynamics
under windfalls. Since consumption and investment decisions are optimal, the model also serves to analyze
current account norms (benchmarks).We apply themodel to the Economic andMonetary Community of Central
Africa and discuss how our results can be used to inform external sustainability analyses in RRDCs.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
External imbalances often concern policy makers, since persistent
current account misalignments can threaten external and ﬁnancial
stability (IMF, 2014). For developing countries, external sustainability is
challenging, as they are typically subject to large external shocks and
may have limited ability to ﬁnance current account deﬁcits (Vegh,
2013).Moreover, asmany of these countries have ﬁxed exchange rate ar-
rangements, persistent current account deﬁcits can be associated with
currency overvaluation—a real exchange rate misalignment—which in
the past has preceded well-known currency crisis (Kaminsky et al.,
1998).
External sustainability issues may be compounded in resource rich
developing countries (RRDCs).1 During resource windfalls, RRDCsndy Berg, Ed Bufﬁe, Raphael
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to low-income and lower–mid-
e.g., oil and minerals).
. This is an open access article undermust decide how much to consume or save out of this transitory and
sizeable resource income, as well as how much to invest. But these de-
cisions are not innocuous for macroeconomic and external stability,
since they can determine whether RRDCs may face, or avert, boom–
bust cycles and external sector disruptions. Not surprisingly, history
shows that many countries that failed to manage resource booms also
faced abrupt external adjustments.2With the signiﬁcant rise of resource
prices in the last decade, followedby the recent decline, the issue of how
to manage resource windfalls in RRDCs and its implications for external
sustainability have once more come to the fore of policy and academic
discussions (IMF, 2012a). And, as part of these discussions, there is a re-
vived interest in determining the appropriate level of the current
account—the norm—in RRDCs.
Assessing external sustainability, however, is not an easy task. This
requires identifying a current account balance consistentwith economic
fundamentals that can serve as a norm (benchmark).3When the current
account balance is substantially below this norm, the real exchange rate
is assessed to be overvalued, and the country will eventually need to
generate external surpluses to correct this imbalance. If, over time, the
country is unable to generate the necessary surpluses or to externally2 Manzano and Rigobon (2007) argue that during the 1970s, when commodity prices
were high, natural resource abundant countries used them as collateral for borrowing.
As the 1980s witnessed an important fall in these prices, some countries faced debt crises.
3 See Lee et al. (2008) and IMF (2012b) which describe the Consultative Group on Ex-
change Rate Issues (CGER) and External Balance Assessment (EBA)methodologies, devel-
oped at the International Monetary Fund.
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Fig. 1. Current Account Balance vs. Real GDP per Capita in Selected Resource-Rich
Countries (RRCs). Following IMF (2012c), RRCs are deﬁned as those countries whose
natural resources comprise at least 20% of total exports or of natural resource revenues.
The label “lower income RRCs” (“higher income RRCs”) refers to RRCs whose 2010 GNI
per capita is below (above) USD 3975, according to the World Bank Atlas. RRDCs corre-
spond to the “lower income RRCs”. The ﬁgure presents the average current account
balances and real GDP per capita during the period 1980–2011.
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course,may have signiﬁcant output, consumption, andwelfare costs, es-
pecially in those countries with ﬁxed exchange rate regimes, where a
currency crisis frequently accompanies the real exchange rate adjust-
ment. If, on the other hand, the current account is signiﬁcantly above
the norm, some relative price adjustmentmay also be required.Welfare
costs are also present in this case, where the imbalance may be the re-
sult of “excessive” saving—e.g., forgone consumption or investment.
Development considerations are important for analyzing the dy-
namics and the level of the current account in RRDCs during windfalls.
In a frictionless developed open economy, the famous Friedman's
(1957) permanent income hypothesis (PIH) applies: the economy
should save most of the windfall abroad to smooth consumption and
preserve resource wealth, generating a current account surplus.4 How-
ever, with development considerations, saving abroad the windfall
may not be the most appropriate policy. Collier et al. (2010) and van
der Ploeg and Venables (2011a) argue that because of capital scarcity
and external borrowing constraints, RRDCs should use windfalls to
speed up development. Capital scarcity implies that the return to capital
is likely to be higher than world interest rates, then investing domesti-
cally in physical and human capital ensures a much higher return than
saving abroad. In addition, since resource revenues help relax borrow-
ing constraints, RRDCs can expand the ﬁnancing sources to increase
development investment and front-load consumption. As a result, re-
source windfalls may be associated with current account deﬁcits in
RRDCs.
At ﬁrst glance, empirical evidence suggests that, relative to resource-
rich countries with higher income, RRDCs have faced on average lower
current account balances, including deﬁcits (Fig. 1)5. This raises several
questions regarding development considerations: How important are
investment needs, aswell as investment frictions, in shaping the current
account dynamics and external sustainability in RRDCs? What is the
role of external borrowing constraints for this dynamics? Given these
considerations, what is the appropriate current account balance for
RRDCs that face a windfall?
In this paper, we take a model-based approach to address these
questions. We develop a neoclassical small open economy model with
capital accumulation and frictions that capture pervasive features in
RRDCs, including capital scarcity, absorptive capacity constraints, inefﬁ-
ciencies in investment, and external borrowing constraints that can be
relaxed when resources lower the country risk premium. We focus in
particular on investment for development, which is mostly directed to
increase physical and human capital, in order to boost non-resource
GDP growth. Relative to models that only consider consumption and
satisfy the PIH, we show the extent to which these features matter
qualitatively and quantitatively in driving the current account. More-
over, by solving the social planner's problem, consumption and invest-
ment decisions are optimal subject to the aforementioned constraints,
as is the implied current account balance. Then the model can provide
a current account norm to analyze external sustainability.
We rely on numerical simulations to derive our results and under-
score the role of development considerations in the determination of a
current account norm for RRDCs. The main ﬁndings of our analysis are
as follows.
First, absent investment frictions and capital scarcity, constraints to
borrow externally imply that oil windfalls tend to lower the current
account balance. In the model, borrowing constraints are captured by
a country risk premium that depends on the country's external debt,
as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003). With these constraints, the
windfall is used to repay debt, lowering the premium and the interest
rates. This encourages consumption frontloading and stimulates public
and private investment (in domestically owned capital). As a result,
borrowing restrictions imply that RRDCs should register lower current4 See, for instance, Barnett and Ossowski (2003), and Segura-Ubiergo et al. (2014).
5 For further empirical analysis see Beidas-Strom and Cashin (2011).account balances than those of an economy that can borrow freely
from abroad. This effect can be magniﬁed if the oil wealth is also
assumed to reduce the premium, as in Mansoorian (1991) and Arezki
and Brückner (2012). With a windfall, credit constraints are then
further relaxed, and borrowing helps increase investment, inducing
even current account deﬁcits. Note that the discussed interest rate
mechanism is similar to the one presented in van der Ploeg and
Venables (2011a) and van der Ploeg (2012). These works, however, as-
sume that private capital is owned by foreigners,which is not innocuous
for the implications for the current account. In their models, it becomes
optimal to run very large current account deﬁcits ﬁnanced by foreign in-
vestment, while the economy never accumulates domestically owned
private capital.
Second, high investment inefﬁciencies or absorptive capacity con-
straints decelerate capital accumulation implying higher current ac-
count balances than those in economies without these frictions. In the
model, absorptive capacity constraints are related to capital adjustment
costs that increase with the investment rate; while investment inefﬁ-
ciencies mean that one dollar of investment translates into less than
one dollar of productive capital (Pritchett, 2000). With these frictions,
the windfall still leads to some front-loading of consumption—moving
away from the standard PIH consumption behavior—aswell as some in-
crease in private and public investment. But since there are substantial
inefﬁciencies and absorptive capacity constraints, it turns out to be op-
timal to reduce the speed of investment,which in turn pushes for higher
current account balances. The relevance of investment frictions in
RRDCs has been explored in previous studies, although not in the con-
text of external sustainability. Berg et al. (2013) show, for example,
that gradually investing a windfall and making non-resource revenues
available to cover recurrent costs of public capital can alleviate absorp-
tive capacity constraints, help preserve resource wealth and address
concerns about growth sustainability and macrostability. In addition,
Baunsgaard et al. (2012), van der Ploeg and Venables (2011b) and van
der Ploeg (2012) discuss the “parking strategy” of postponing domestic
spending until the economy is ready to implement efﬁcient spending
choices.
Third, we show that adverse resource shocks may call for buffer-
stock savings and, therefore, current account surpluses. Although our
analysis assumes perfect foresight and is silent on precautionary saving
issues, we investigate the consequences of having an expected sudden
drop in the price of the natural resource some years after the windfall
146 J.D. Araujo et al. / Journal of Development Economics 120 (2016) 144–156starts. As agents foresee this drop in prices and income, they tend to
save more of the windfall before the price drop occurs. This contributes
to a higher current account balance in the short term relative to that
when prices are not expected to decline.6 In the literature, some work
has tried to analyze precautionary saving issues in resource rich coun-
tries. For instance, Bems and deCarvalho Filho (2011) study these issues
in amodel where investment and frictions do not play a role. Cherif and
Hasanov (2012a, 2012b) also discuss these issues but in a model with
constant “golden rules” as investment decisions. Our work differs from
theirs by considering endogenous optimal investment decisions and
other features such as absorptive capacity and borrowing constraints.
Fourth, we investigate the role of capital scarcity for the current
account dynamics,whilemaintaining borrowing constraints and invest-
ment frictions. In line with the macro-development literature, capital
scarcity in our model is associated with a high marginal product of
capital (van der Ploeg and Venables, 2011a). And if the marginal
product of capital is above the cost of borrowing, it becomes optimal
to use the windfall to increase public and private investment to speed
up development. This capital scarcity mechanism is different from the
previously discussed risk premium mechanism that induces more
investment—part of the windfall is used to repay debt, lowering the
risk premium and interest rates—and can lead to increases in invest-
ment and, therefore, to lower current account balances.
Finally, we show how our model can be used to produce a current
account norm for external sustainability assessments in RRDCs. We cal-
ibrate the model to the Economic and Monetary Community of Central
Africa (CEMAC).7 We show that our current account norm for CEMAC
falls in between theunderlying current account deﬁcits and the relative-
ly high surpluses obtained under Bems and de Carvalho Filho (2009),
which is a PIH-based approach, abstracts from investment, capital scar-
city, and credit constraints.8 These results depend, of course, on making
explicit investment and its frictions. Aswe assumehigher absorptive ca-
pacity constraints, then our benchmark becomes closer to the norm by
Bems and de Carvalho Filho, since it becomes optimal to reduce the
speed of investment and save abroad some of the windfall. By using
our model to produce a norm, our paper relates to the external sustain-
ability assessment literature (Bayoumi and Thomas, 2009; IMF, 2012a;
Lee et al., 2008; Prati et al., 2011). This literature, however, is mostly
empirical. Our approach is instead model-based and reminiscent of
previous efforts that attempted to evaluate optimal current account
deﬁcits in emerging and advanced countries (e.g., Blanchard and
Giavazzi, 2002).
Given development considerations, our model provides a current
account benchmark that seemsmore suitable for RRDCs than thebench-
marks associated with PIH-based methodologies. Nevertheless our
framework is also subject to some caveats andmisses particular features
of these countries that may be crucial in the country-by-country assess-
ment of external sustainability. Our model ignores, for instance, invest-
ment that enables resource extraction. This is not trivial. Ernst and
Young (2014) and IFC (2013) provide evidence that this type of invest-
ment is signiﬁcant in RRDCs—it may amount to several times their
GDP—and, therefore, may affect considerably the level of the current ac-
count and the external sustainability assessment. Similarly, our model6 There is a vast literature on the link between the terms of trade (tot) and the current
account. Some works ﬁnd that a temporary rise of the tot improves the current account
through consumption-smoothing behavior (Kent and Cashin, 2003; Ogaki et al., 1996;
Spatafora and Warner, 1999). This effect can diminish in magnitude with the duration of
the tot shock (Obstfeld, 1982; Svensson and Razin, 1983) or be invertedwith the presence
of investment decisions (Sen and Turnovsky, 1989; Serven, 1999).
7 The region, which has a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, is a good example of the chal-
lenges faced by RRDCs, as it has been credit constrained and is endowed with exhaustible
natural resources. In addition, it faces daunting developing needs that require sizeable
public investments, which are not exempt from inefﬁciencies and absorptive capacity con-
straints (Tabova and Baker, 2012).
8 Their approach determines the current account balance that would bring the net for-
eign asset (NFA) position of a country to a desirable level, allowing for a long-term trend in
NFA in order to accommodate the temporary nature of exhaustible resources.abstracts from FDI ﬂows. Over time, these ﬂows have becomemore im-
portant in low-income countries and represent a relevant source of ﬁ-
nancing of current account deﬁcits (Dorsey et al., 2008).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 pre-
sents the model. Section 3 shows some model simulations to shed
light on how introducing investment and the aforementioned frictions
can affect the current account dynamics. Section 4 applies the model
to CEMAC and illustrates how to use the model to assess external
sustainability in RRDCs. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2. The model
Weuse a ﬂexible-pricemodel of a small open economy, but enrich it
with investment inefﬁciencies, absorptive capacity constraints and a
country risk premium that captures foreign credit constraints. There is
exogenous productivity growth at the rate ga and population growth
at the rate gn , so in the long-run all the variables grow at the rate g,
where ð1þ gÞ ¼ ð1þ gaÞð1þ gnÞ. For simplicity, we present its structure
in stationary terms, rescaling variables by effective units of labor AtLt,
where At is the productivity level and Lt denotes labor. That is, xt≡ XtAtLt
for all the variables Xt. In this way, all the transformed variables are con-
stant in the long run (steady-state).
The economy is populated by a large number of identical and inﬁ-
nitely lived households with perfect foresight. The representative
agent derives utility from private consumption (ct) and public con-
sumption (gt) according to:
X∞
t¼0
βt
ct−ϰct−1ð Þ1−γ
1−γ
þ κ gt−ϰgt−1ð Þ
1−γ
1−γ
" #
: ð1Þ
The parameter β equalsBð1þ gaÞ1−γð1þ gnÞ
1−γ
A1−γ0 L
1−γ
0 whereB is
the timediscount factor and satisﬁesB∈ (0, 1). The coefﬁcient of relative
risk aversion is given by γ. The parameter κ controls the preference
share for private and public consumptions andϰ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the in-
tensity of internal habit formation. We introduce habit formation to
allow for a smooth path of private consumption, as discussed by
Christiano et al. (2005), and to avoid unrealistically drastic adjustments
in public consumption.
The economy has two sectors: the non-oil sector (n) and the oil
sector (o), whose outputs are denoted by ytn and yto, respectively. The
production function in the non-oil sector is given by
ynt ¼ akθkt−1sθst−1; with θk þ θs b 1; ð2Þ
where kt and st are private and public capitals, respectively; while, for
simplicity oil production is subject to exogenous windfalls.
We incorporate two types of investment frictions that capture
inefﬁciencies in investing and absorptive capacity constraints. As in
Agénor (2010) and Berg et al. (2013), among others, we assume that
all public investment its does not necessarily translate into productive
public capital st. The public capital accumulation equation is
1þ gð Þst ¼ esist þ 1−δsð Þst−1; ð3Þ
where δs is the depreciation rate and the efﬁciency parameter es ∈ [0, 1]
captures inefﬁciencies, so one dollar spent on public investment may
translate into less than one dollar of productive public capital. As argued
by Pritchett (2000), these inefﬁciencies are present in developing
countries because of waste and corruption, the absence of market
pressures to ensure that all projects have the highest possible rate of
return, or simply misclassiﬁcation of current spending (e.g. salary
payments to civil servants).9 Similar inefﬁciencies exist in the creation9 On these issues see Algan et al. (2010).
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1þ gð Þkt ¼ ekikt þ 1−δkð Þkt−1: ð4Þ
We model absorptive capacity constraints as capital adjustment
costs taking the form of
ACst ¼
ϕs
2
st
st−1
−1
 2
st−1 and AC
k
t ¼
ϕk
2
kt
kt−1
−1
 2
kt−1: ð5Þ
As in Bufﬁe et al. (2012), these reﬂect the fact that skilled adminis-
trators are in scarce supply in RRDCs and, therefore, ambitious public
and private investment programs are often plagued by poor planning,
weak oversight, and a myriad of coordination problems, all of which
contribute to cost overruns. The parameters ϕk and ϕs determine the
severity of these absorptive capacity constraints.10
Developing economies are also characterized by their inability to
fully access international capital markets, because of borrowing
constraints. At each period t, foreign lenders may impose an aggregate
borrowing limit d on the domestic economy. As a result, the level of
external liabilities dt for the economymust satisfydt ≤dþ ψVt, whereVt
¼∑Ti¼t

1
1þ r
i−t
yoi is the net present value (NPV) of the oil output
ﬂows from time t until the depletion time T, r* is the risk-free world in-
terest rate, andψ∈ [0, 1]. In this setup, resource revenues (ψVt) can help
relax borrowing constraints enabling the country to contract debt be-
yond the limit d at a lower cost, as argued by Mansoorian (1991) and
Arezki and Brückner (2012).
To capture these borrowing constraints, we assume the country
faces an interest rate with a country risk premium that depends on
the stock of its external liabilities. In particular, we assume that the
premium (rt− r*) can be represented by
Πt ≡ rt−r ¼ πρ21
exp ρ1 dt−d−ψVt
  
−ρ2 dt−d−ψVt
 
−ρ3
 	
; ð6Þ
where π, ρ1, ρ2 N 0,ρ3 ¼ expð−ρ1dÞ þ ρ2dandd is the steady-state level
of debt. This representation combines an exponential with a linear
function. For low values of ρ2, as in the calibration below, the exponen-
tial form drives the premium for highly indebted countries; while the
linear form becomes the main driver of the premium for creditor
countries—i.e., creditors will actually face almost no premium as the
supply curve of funds becomes ﬂatter. Moreover, the representation in-
cludes a constant debt premium πρ3/ρ12 that does not depend on debt.
The country risk premium speciﬁcation, which depends on debt,
serves several purposes. First, although our motivation is to capture
occasionally binding credit constraints, this speciﬁcation helps us get
around the highly complex and technical issues related to having
inequality constraints in dynamic optimization.11 Second, it ensures
stationarity of foreign debt holdings, as explained by Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2003). Third, it captures different degrees of international
capital mobility or borrowing constraints. The degree of the capital ac-
count openness depends to a great extent on the composite parameter
π/ρ12. For very small values of this ratio, the capital account is in effect
fully open reﬂecting no borrowing constraints. For very high values,
on the other hand, the capital account is almost closed because borrow-
ing constraints bind.10 We could alsomodel these constraints as adjustment costs that affect the capital accu-
mulation Eqs. (3) and (4), as in Christiano et al (2005) and Fernandez-Villaverde et al.
(2011). Our results would still hold under this speciﬁcation.We favor our speciﬁcation be-
cause itmakes explicit the link between absorptive capacity constraints and cost overruns
in the budget constraint.
11 On these issues see Algan et al. (2010).The current account can be expressed as
cat ¼ dt−1− 1þ gð Þdt ; ð7Þ
while the resource constraint of the economy corresponds to
1þ gð Þdt ¼ 1þ rt−1ð Þdt−1 þ ct þ ikt þ ACkt þ gt þ ist
þ ACst−ynt−yot−Tt ; ð8Þ
where Tt denotes exogenous transfers to the economy not related to
natural resources.
We assume that there is a social plannerwho chooses the sequences
for private and public consumption, private and public capital stock,
private and public investment, and external borrowing {ct, gt, its, it-
c
t, gt, its, itk, st, kt, dt}t = 0∞ to maximize (1) subject to (2)–(8), given
k0, s0, d0 and the exogenous path for {yto}t = 0∞ and {Tt}t = 0∞ . The ﬁrst
order conditions of this problem presented in Appendix A can be re-
duced to12
c^−γt −ϰ 1þ gð Þβc^−γtþ1
c^−γtþ1−ϰ 1þ gð Þβc^−γtþ2
¼ β 1þ r þΠt þ ∂Πt∂dt
dt
 
; ð9Þ
c^−γt −ϰ 1þ gð Þβc^−γtþ1 ¼ κ½g^−γt −ϰ 1þ gð Þβg^−γtþ1; ð10Þ
ek θk
yntþ1
kt
þ 1−δk
ek
−
∂ACktþ1
∂kt
 !
1þ gþ ek
∂ACkt
∂kt
¼
1þ r þΠt þ ∂Πt∂dt
dt
1þ g ; ð11Þ
and
es θs
yntþ1
st
þ 1−δs
es
−
∂ACstþ1
∂st
 
1þ gþ es ∂AC
s
t
∂st
¼
1þ r þΠt þ ∂Πt∂dt
dt
1þ g : ð12Þ
The interpretationof these conditions is straightforward. Condition (9)
is the Euler equation for private consumption ct including the effects of in-
ternal habits, since ĉt= ct− ϰct − 1. Eq. (10) equates the marginal utility
of private and public consumption, where g^t ¼ gt  ϰgt1 . Condi-
tions (11) and (12) require the returns on private and public capital, net
of marginal adjustment costs, to equal the real interest rate on external
debt. These conditions make explicit that the solution of the social
planner's problem is a constrained optimal solution. The reason is that
the social planner solves for the optimal allocations given constraints,
such as absorptive capacity, borrowing constraints, and inefﬁciencies in
investment. These can be viewed as frictions/constraints that take very
long to rectify. There are, however, some differences among these fric-
tions/constraints, as we proceed to explain.
In the dynamics, the social planner attempts to minimize endoge-
nously the effects of the frictions associatedwith the country risk premi-
um and the absorptive capacity constraints. The planner internalizes the
effect of more borrowing on the country risk premium. As such, the
planner is aware of the marginal increase in the cost of debt due to
more borrowing—the term ∂Πt∂dt dt in Condition (9)—and therefore tries
to avoid overborrowing. Similarly, the planner internalizes the effect
of more public and private investments on the absorptive capacity
constraints—the terms ∂AC
x
tþ1
∂xt
and ∂AC
x
t
∂xt
for x= k, s in Eqs. (11) and (12).
Increasing these investments leads to higher adjustment costs, which
in turn reduces the return on capital. This forces the planner to be
more cautious about overreactingwhen increasing investment. Instead,
the public and private investment inefﬁciencies associated with ek and12 Transversality conditions on st, kt, and dt are also imposed.
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steady-state.13 Still, below we will show the effects of exogenously im-
proving public and private investment efﬁciency—increasing es and ek.
We provide now a deﬁnition of equilibrium in this open economy
model.
Deﬁnition 1. Given k0, s0, and d0, and the sequences { yto}t = 0∞ and
{Tt}t = 0∞ , an equilibrium is a set of sequences {ct, gt, its, itk, st, kt, dt, ytn, ACts,
ACt
k, rt, cat}t = 0∞ satisfying Eqs. (2)–(8) the ﬁrst order Conditions (9)–(12),
and the transversality conditions for st, kt and dt.0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0
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Fig. 2. Interest Rate Country Risk Premium Function.3. The role of investment and frictions in shaping the current
account dynamics
3.1. Calibration
We rely on numerical simulations and calibrate the parameters of
the model to the CEMAC region, when it is possible.14 Otherwise we
rely on econometric estimates or frequently used parameter values in
the literature for developing countries. The time frequency is annual.
Using CEMAC data to illustrate our external sustainability analysis we
calibrate the following parameters. The steady-state level of debtd is set to
match the 2010 debt level of 13% of GDP. The population and technolog-
ical growth rates in the region correspond to gn ¼ 0:024 and ga ¼ 0:014,
respectively, based on averages of the last two decades. And the parame-
ter κ in the utility is chosen tomatch the 2010 ratio of public consumption
to private consumption (κ= 0.15). The productivity parameter a is cho-
sen so that total output is normalized to one, initially. Moreover, it is pos-
sible to use the oil production forecasts of the region to deﬁne natural
resource shocks in the simulations. We will do so below, when we use
themodel to generate a current account norm. For themoment, in the an-
alytical experiments we will impose a stylized windfall that follows an
AR(2) process, giving a hump-shaped path.
Regarding parameter values found in the literature, we set the rela-
tive risk aversion coefﬁcient γ—or the inverse of the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution—equal to 10:34, which is in line with the average
estimate for low-income countries in Ogaki et al. (1996). Following
van der Ploeg and Venables (2011a), the production parameters for pri-
vate and public capitals are θk = 0.4 and θs = 0.25, respectively.15 The
depreciation rates of private and public capitals δk and δs correspond
to 5.5%,which are close to values estimated by Bu (2004).We are some-
what optimistic about the investment frictions: the public and private
efﬁciency parameters ek and es are both set to 0.5, which are slightly
above the estimates by Pritchett (2000) for sub-Saharan Africa ranging
between 0.08 and 0.49; while the capital adjustment cost parameters ϕk
and ϕs are picked to match costs overruns of 25% for both private and
public capital accumulation, which Foster and Briceño-Garmendia
(2009) argue to be 35% or higher for new projects in Africa.16 Neverthe-
less there is a lot of uncertainty about these parameters. The world in-
terest rate corresponds to r* = 0.055, as in van der Ploeg and
Venables (2011a), and the habit persistence parameter ϰ is set to 0.7,
which is in line with estimates of the macroeconomic literature such
as those in Kano and Nason (2014).13 If the capital adjustment costs are in the capital accumulation equation, they can be
interpreted as time-varying inefﬁciencies that the social planner can internalize and there-
fore try to minimize over time. As long as these inefﬁciencies do not disappear at the
steady-state, the constrained optimal solution of the social planner's problem in a model
where the adjustment costs are in the capital accumulation equation will be similar to
our solution where adjustment costs are in the budget constraint.
14 The model was simulated with the software Dynare. See http://www.cepremap.cnrs.
fr/dynare.
15 This implies a return on public capital of 23%. Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009)
estimate returns for electricity, water and sanitation, irrigation, and roads range from
17% to 24% in low-income countries. Similarly, the macro-based estimates in Dalgaard
and Hansen (2005) cluster between 15% and 30% for a wide array of different estimators.
16 See also Lledo and Poplawski-Ribeiro (2013), among others.We apply a non-linear curve ﬁttingmethod to estimate the parame-
ters of the risk premium function (6) using the debt stock levels and an-
nual spreads data for 33 countries from 1994 to 2007.17 Considering the
adverse effects of the global ﬁnancial crisis, we exclude the years from
2008 onwards. The bond spreads are measured as the differences be-
tween the annual average domestic interest rates and the world risk-
free rates—U.S. 10-year government bond rates, using the Emerging
Markets Bond Index Global dataset. Debt, which is expressed as a ratio
of gross national income (GNI), is the country's total debt from the
World Development Indicators. Although domestic debt is becoming
more prominent in RRDCs, most of the debt is still external. We then
apply a non-linear least squares method to ﬁt the non-symmetric risk
premium function and estimate the parameters constraining them to
be greater or equal to zero, yielding π = 0.15, ρ1 = 1.40, and ρ2 = 0,
which are signiﬁcant at the 1% level (see Fig. 2 for the ﬁtted curve).
However, an important caveat is in order. Despite the interesting eco-
nomic implications of having the value of oil wealth Vt in the risk premi-
um function, it is challenging to come up with sensible estimates for Vt
to estimate the parameter ψ. This is due in part to the fact that this
variable is forward-looking. So in the estimation, we impose ψ = 0.
Nevertheless, belowwe explore analytically the consequences of raising
this parameter.
3.2. Analytical experiments
We illustrate the role of investment and frictions in shaping the
current account dynamics, by considering ﬁve different scenarios in
whichwe vary some of the previously calibrated parameters. To convey
the results more clearly, we start the simulations at the steady-state,
except for the last scenario that captures the role of capital scarcity
and, therefore, development considerations. Later, in the application
to CEMAC we start the simulations off steady-state. Also, for the sake
of simplicity and clarity, in these analytical experiments we assume
full investment efﬁciency, i.e., ek = es = 1. In the CEMAC simulations
we use ek = es = 0.5.
• Scenario 1 reﬂects an almost frictionless open economy without
external borrowing constraints (π/ρ12 ≃ 0), absorptive capacity
constraints (ϕk = ϕs = 0), and resource wealth in the risk premium
function (ψ= 0). It mimics a PIH scenario.17 By running linear regressions, Akitoby and Stratmann (2008) and Van der Ploeg and
Venables (2011a) ﬁnd empirical evidence of a positive link between interest rate spreads
and the debt to gross national income ratios for a subset of developing economies.
Fig. 3. AnAlmost Frictionless Economy thatMimics PIH. Scenario 1: No External Borrowing Constraints, No Absorptive Capacity Constraints, and No ResourceWealth in the Risk Premium
Function.
19 These two scenarios have different steady-states. In the imperfect capital mobility
case, the high country risk premium implies a lower discount factor reﬂecting impatient
agents. This explains in part the consumption tilting. In contrast, in the case of almost per-
fect international mobility, the country risk premium is signiﬁcantly lower and therefore
the discount factor much higher. Hence agents in this economy are more patient. The
149J.D. Araujo et al. / Journal of Development Economics 120 (2016) 144–156• Scenario 2 illustrates the role of credit constraints by using the
estimates for the interest rate country risk premium function from
the calibration.
• Scenario 3 introduces absorptive capacity constraints according to our
calibration besides borrowing constraints like in Scenario 2.
• Scenario 4 is like Scenario 2, except that oil lowers the country risk
premium and relaxes the borrowing constraints (ψ= 0.1).
• Scenario 5 shows the role of capital scarcity by starting simulations off
steady-state. At the initial point, public and private capitals are at 50%
of their steady-state values. The remaining assumptions are the same
as those in Scenario 3.
When there are no borrowing constraints as well as other frictions,
the PIH holds, implying signiﬁcant current account surpluses from
natural resource windfalls. In Scenario 1, it is optimal to save the wind-
fall by accumulating foreign assets,which earn the risk-free internation-
al interest rate, to smooth consumption over time (Fig. 3).18 Output and
capital variations are relatively small. This scenario mimics the PIH
results of Bems and de Carvalho Filho (2009), in which a windfall
generates large current account surpluses and external savings for
future consumption.
Saving most of the windfall abroad may no longer be appropriate
under borrowing constraints, implying that such constraints tend to
lower the current account balance (Fig. 4). In Scenario 2, where bor-
rowing constraints are prominent, proﬁtable investment opportuni-
ties are forgone as the premium on borrowing is too high (or credit
is unavailable). In this case, part of the oil windfall can be used to
repay debt, which drives down the country-risk premium and there-
fore interest rates. This, together with the windfall, helps increase
private and public investment and frontload consumption. As a re-
sult, the windfall is mostly converted into productive capital leading18 Negative values of debt denote accumulation of foreign assets.to very small savings abroad and lowering the current account
balance.19
Absorptive capacity constraints—capital adjustment costs—also play
a key role in shaping the current account dynamics (see van der Ploeg
and Venables, 2013). Fig. 5 shows that during resource booms, these
constraints induce a larger current account balance than the balance
associated with no constraints. Scenario 3 shows that with higher
costs for accumulating capital, a larger portion of the windfall is used
to repay debt which helps lower the country risk premium and interest
rate further relative to Scenario 2,where these constraints are absent. As
a result, it becomes optimal to tilt consumption further and reduce the
speed of public and private investment, leading to less accumulation
of capital. These effects imply that the current account balance tends
to be higher under absorptive capacity constraints than without them.
Note that similar resultswould hold if the public and private investment
inefﬁciencies increase (lower ek and es).
When natural resource wealth helps relax borrowing constraints,
windfalls can induce current account deﬁcits. If a country's risk premi-
um depends not only on external debt but also on resource assets
underground, a resource boom can relax the borrowing constraints
and therefore lower the country risk premium, as shown by Scenario
4 in Fig. 6. In this scenario, countries take advantage of lower interest
rates and decide to boost current private and public investment by
contracting more debt. The windfall then translates into a current
account deﬁcit in the short to medium term. This starkly differs from
the results in Scenarios 1–3, where a windfall always leads tosteady-state value of debt, which is given exogenously to the model, has also implications
for the discount factor. At the steady-state, a lower debt value would imply a higher dis-
count factor and more patient agents, leading to higher current account balances in the
dynamics.
Fig. 4. The Effects of Imperfect Capital Mobility. Scenario 2: With Borrowing Constraints, No Absorptive Capacity Constraints, and No Resource Wealth in the Risk Premium Function.
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cial liabilities (foreign debt), leading to current account surpluses.
Adverse resource shocks may induce more savings abroad in the
present, raising the current account balance. Fig. 7 simulates an expect-
ed drop in resource income at year 5, reﬂecting for instance a decline in
resource prices in Scenario 3. The drop generates a buffer-stock savings
effect where agents save abroad for bad times: since the decline inFig. 5. Absorptive Capacity Constraints. Scenario 2:With Borrowing Constraints, No Absorptive
Scenario 2 Except for Having Absorptive Capacity Constraints.prices is expected then consumption is still smoothed over time but
does not increase as much as in the case of Scenario 3, where prices
do not fall. This buffer, though, is not related to uncertainty or volatility
of resource revenues—which can induce precautionary savings
effects—since the drop is fully expected. The additional savings lead to
both a lower external debt level and a smaller increase in private and
public investment. The overall impact on external sustainability isCapacity Constraints, and No ResourceWealth in Risk Premium Function; Scenario 3: Like
Fig. 6. Resource Wealth in the Risk Premium Function. Scenario 2: With Borrowing Constraints, No Absorptive Capacity Constraints, and No Resource Wealth in Risk Premium Function;
Scenario 4: Like Scenario 2 except for Resource Wealth in the Risk Premium Function.
151J.D. Araujo et al. / Journal of Development Economics 120 (2016) 144–156then an increase in the current account surplus in the ﬁrst ﬁve years rel-
ative to that of the scenario without the decline in prices.
The last scenario illustrates how capital scarcity may generate lower
current account balances. To capture capital scarcity and inadequate in-
vestment, we start simulations off steady-state and set public and pri-
vate capitals and investments at 50% of their steady-state values. SinceFig. 7. Expected Oil Price Decline. Scenario 3:With Borrowing and Absorptive Capacity Constrai
Like Scenario 3 but with Expected Drop of Oil Price in year 5.capital scarcity pushes up the marginal product of capital, even above
the cost of borrowing, it becomes optimal to use thewindfall to increase
public and private investments, as shown by Scenario 5 in Fig. 8. van der
Ploeg and Venables (2011a) underscore this point. However, this direct
mechanism throughwhich thewindfall translates into investment is in-
dependent of the previously discussed risk premium mechanism thatnts, and No ResourceWealth in Risk Premium Function. Scenario 3With Oil Price Decline:
Fig. 8. Capital Scarcity. Scenario 5:With Borrowing and Absorptive Capacity Constraints, No ResourceWealth in Risk Premium Function and Capital Scarcity. Simulations start off steady-
state.
152 J.D. Araujo et al. / Journal of Development Economics 120 (2016) 144–156induces more investment—part of the windfall is used to repay debt,
lowering the risk premium and interest rates. To see this, consider the
case where there is no windfall, also presented in Fig. 8 . In this case,
the economy is still capital scarce and the marginal product of capital
so high that, despite the risk premium associated with higher debt,
the social planner prefers borrowing from abroad to increase consump-
tion and investments in private and public capital. This, of course, tends
to decrease the current account balance and, absent the windfall, this
balance turns into a deﬁcit. The windfall activates the risk premium
mechanismwhich, together with the capital scarcity mechanism, raises
public and private investments and accelerates development. By itself
the capital scarcity mechanism can lead to investment increases and
therefore to lower current account balances.
4. Assessing external sustainability in RRDCs: an application
to CEMAC
This section illustrates how ourmodel can be used to assess external
sustainability in RRDCs, applying it to oil-producing countries (Republic
of Congo, Chad, Cameroon, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea) of the
Economic andMonetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC). This re-
gion faces the challenge of managing exhaustible natural resources
while simultaneously addressing development needs. Oil dominance
is prominent: on average, oil accounts for about 40% of regional GDP,
70% of total exports, and 75% of total government revenue. However,
after having peaked in the 2000s, oil production and associated reve-
nues are projected to decline rapidly over the next decades, after 2013
(see Fig. 9). This is a matter of concern, since these countries have
been running current account deﬁcits, since 2009 (Fig. 9), and continue
to face daunting development needs such as large infrastructure gaps
and low levels of human capital, which in turn may take time to over-
come, given investment inefﬁciencies and absorptive capacity concerns.
Access to external ﬁnancing is still limited in the CEMAC region.
While national treasuries are allowed to issue Treasury bills and bonds
through weekly and monthly auctions, the government securities
markets have yet to take off in the region. As of mid-2010, there was
no signiﬁcant track record of bond issuance. In 2007, Gabon successfullyissued a 10-year USD 1 billion Eurobond, registering strong investor
interest. As of April 2011, Gabon received long-term sovereign debt rat-
ings of BB — for both local and foreign currency by Fitch and Standard
and Poor's. The fairly low rating was reﬂected in interest spreads.
The region is plagued with persistently dire infrastructure gaps.
Ranganathan et al. (forthcoming) ﬁnd, for instance, that mobile and
mainline telephone subscriptions and access to sanitation, thoughmar-
ginally better than in other RRDCs, are lower than in resource rich peers.
The installed generation capacity is low and access to power is limited,
while prices for infrastructure services are very high relative to global
andAfrican standards. For example, power prices and road freight tariffs
cost three times as much in the CEMAC region as in other developing
regions. This suggests that public investment has been consistently
suboptimal in the region, even before the resource windfall.
Furthermore, entrenched public investment inefﬁciencies and
absorptive capacity constraints need to be addressed in the region.
Ranganathan et al. (forthcoming) estimate that roughly 1.2% of the
region's GDP per year can be recovered through addressing these inefﬁ-
ciencies. The power sector, with inefﬁciencies valued at 0.8% of GDP
annually, represents by far the largest drain, due to under-pricing and
operational deﬁciencies. Similarly, the transport and water sectors inef-
ﬁciencies amount to some 0.2% of GDP of resources annually, as a result
of low capital budget execution and under-pricing.
Before and after the global crisis, the oil price and production booms
improved current account balances and pushed up public investment in
the CEMAC region. Increases in oil prices and production caused a boom
in government revenues, which boosted government spending, particu-
larly capital spending (Fig. 9). Nevertheless, despite considerable addi-
tional public investment, non-oil GDP growth has not really picked up
and actually fell below the 2000–04 average. Potential explanations of
this decline are that resources may have migrated from the non-oil sec-
tor towards oil production, a potential manifestation of Sachs and
Warner (1995) “resource curse” hypothesis, or that the inefﬁciencies
in investments translated into inadequate infrastructure services, a
poor business environment, and low-quality health and education
services, affecting growth. Yet, before 2009, the current account for
the region registered larger balances. As a consequence, net foreign
Source: IMF WEO and authors' calculations
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Fig. 9. CEMAC Outlook: Selected Macroeconomic Variables 2006–2016 as of WEO April 2011 vintage.
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2009 was associated with the global ﬁnancial crisis, but soon after a
new oil price boom induced an improvement in the current account
as well as in government revenues and public investment. All these in-
gredients call for an external sustainability assessment of this resource
rich but capital scarce region (Akitoby and Coorey, 2012).
We apply our model to study the current account dynamics using
WEO April 2011 vintage data for CEMAC from 2011 to 2016, a period
that is supposed to cover the most recent oil windfall in the region.
This allows us to come up with a current account norm for the region
and compare it with other existing benchmarks. We compare our esti-
mated norm with the real-time underlying current account for the
region—the projected current account balance at the time of the wind-
fall taking into account the IMF countries macroeconomic frameworks
and authorities plans—as well as with the external sustainability (ES)
norm from Bems and de Carvalho Filho (2009), which corresponds to
the external sector balance consistentwith a long-term trend in net for-
eign assets in a model where the PIH is at its core.
To calculate a current account norm with our model, we use our
calibration. In addition, we start the simulations off steady-state, as in
van der Ploeg and Venables (2011a) and Takizawa et al. (2004). This
helps us capture capital scarcity, and the associated mechanism that in-
duces more investment, as well as the fact that investment levels may
have been inadequate in CEMAC. The initial off-steady-state point corre-
sponds to 2010. More speciﬁcally, the initial point matches the 2010
values for the following variables: (i) the current account balance
(3.3% of GDP), (ii) private and public consumption (52.3 and 12.7% of
GDP, respectively), (iii) private and public investment (27.6 and 12.3%
of GDP, respectively), (iv) aid and remittances (1.8% of GDP), and
(v) non-oil GDP (77% of GDP). We also set initial values for the three
state endogenous variables of the model—i.e., we set the external debt20 External positions have been further strengthened by HIPC and MDRI debt relief in
Cameroon, Central African Republic and Republic of Congo.level at the 2010 value of 13% of GDP, and the private and public capital
stocks at 100 and 36% of GDP, respectively. The value of private and
public capitals are based on the average estimates by Cubas (2011) for
Cameroon and Congo. The oil shock reﬂects the 2011–2016 projectedFig. 10. Benchmarks and Underlying Current Account. Comparison of the Model-Im-
plied Current Account (CA) Benchmark with the Real-Time Underlying CA, and the
CA Norm Based on the External Sustainability (ES) Approach.
Fig. 11. The Impact of Absorptive Capacity Constraints and Investment Efﬁciency. Effects of Varying the Degree of Absorptive Capacity Constraints (Left Chart) and Private and Public In-
vestment Efﬁciencies (Right Chart) on the Model-Based Current Account Benchmark.
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tion (quantity) in CEMAC and the 2011 IMF WEO oil price forecasts.
The simulated current account is shown in Fig. 10 (solid line). Our
model provides a benchmark for the current account of about 2.3% of
GDP in 2012. This is below the ES norm of 3.3% of GDP (circles). In the
medium term, our model-based norm points to a deﬁcit of −0.6% of
GDP, while the ES norm corresponds to 1.5% of GDP. Overall, for the pro-
jection period, our analysis delivers a current account benchmark that is
below the ES estimates which capture the PIH. This should not be sur-
prising given the previous discussion. Since our model simulations re-
ﬂect capital scarcity, then the return on both private and public capital
can be higher than the interest rate paid on foreign assets, making it op-
timal to invest domestically in public and private capitals instead of sav-
ing abroad. On the other hand, for the same projection period, our norm
lies above the real-time underlying current account (dashed line). De-
spite the development gaps and investment needs reﬂected in the pro-
jection of the underlying current account that points to a deﬁcit, our
model estimates suggest that the region still needs to improve the efﬁ-
ciency of public and private investment aswell as its absorptive capacity,
to be able to speed up investment and make it more effective.
In fact investment inefﬁciencies and absorptive capacity constraints
can also inﬂuence the return on private and public investment and the
estimated current account benchmark. Given the lack of information
in developing economies, the simulations assume that absorptive
capacity constraints reﬂect investment cost overruns of 25%. However,
investment cost overruns of about 50%—i.e., higher absorptive capacity
constraints—would be associated with higher current account norms
(see Fig. 11, left chart), as it would be optimal to reduce the pace of
investment. On the other hand, raising the efﬁciencies of public and pri-
vate investment would induce much lower current account balances
(see Fig. 11, right chart). By the same token, lowering the efﬁciencies
of public and private investment would induce higher current account
balances. Overall these results underscore the need to quantify these
frictions in developing economies and apply judgment in estimating
current account norms.21
5. Concluding remarks
There is evidence that many oil exporting countries seem to fol-
low the permanent income hypothesis (PIH)—their private spending21 Current account benchmarks could varydepending on the curvature of the risk premi-
um function. For instance, varying π in the range [0.05, 0.4] will imply that the medium-
term current account benchmark, in percent of GDP, will fall within the range [−1,
−0.5]. Sensitivity results are available upon request.decisions are made based on permanent rather than current
income—and tend to run large external surpluses.22 But should resource
rich developing countries (RRDCs) be saving as much as resource
rich developed countries and, therefore, run large current account
surpluses? While in advanced and some emerging economies
transforming natural resource assets into higher external savings
could be the appropriate response to windfalls, RRDCs could use these
windfalls to speed up development by investing in physical and
human capital. This would imply lower current account balances.
In this paper, we develop a model that can be used for external
sustainability assessments in RRDCs, as it takes into account develop-
ment considerations as well as pervasive features in these countries,
such as external borrowing constraints, absorptive capacity constraints,
and capital scarcity. Since consumption and investment decisions are
derived from solving the social planner's problem under the aforemen-
tioned constraints, the implied current account has normative implica-
tions and can provide a norm for external sustainability assessments.
Our prescriptions depend on the features inherent to RRDCs. With
borrowing constraints and capital scarcity, resource wealth should be
mostly turned into physical private and public capitals, instead of saving
it in foreign assets. This tends to lower the current account balances.
However, absorptive capacity constraints make it appropriate to decel-
erate private and public capital accumulation and therefore call for
higher current account balances. Similarly, resource income drops
point to higher current account balances in the short term, as a result
of buffer-stock savings.
Our model application to CEMAC reveals that development consid-
erations such as capital scarcity and borrowing constraints generate
current account norm estimates below those dictated by PIH-based ap-
proaches. However, the role of investment inefﬁciencies and absorptive
capacity constraints is not irrelevant. As these inefﬁciencies increase
and those constraints become more binding, it becomes appropriate
to reduce the pace of public and private investment. And because of
this, our norm estimates tend to converge to those implied by the PIH.
Lastly, ourmodel could be extended in different dimensions to intro-
duce many RRDC features that are also important in external sustain-
ability assessments. First, we could introduce investment that enables
resource extraction, borrowing some of the insights from the analysis
by Aleksandrov et al. (2013), which uses real option models to investi-
gate the optimal oil production and its relationship with extraction
costs and oil prices. Second, we could explore the distinction between
debt and equity ﬂows, including foreign direct investment, which is an22 See Bayoumi and Thomas (2009) and Bems and de Carvalho Filho (2009).
155J.D. Araujo et al. / Journal of Development Economics 120 (2016) 144–156important ﬁnancing source of current account deﬁcits. Third, we could
introduce traded and non-traded goods in our model. This would
allow us to study the real exchange rate and traded sector dynamics
and capture Dutch disease effects (van der Ploeg and Venables, 2013;
van der Ploeg, 2011). These effects may push for lower current account
benchmarks. Finally, we could model commodity price volatility, which
may call for precautionary savings that improve the current account bal-
ance. In the absence of such prudence, countries might borrow exces-
sively in boom years and run into difﬁculties in bust years. We leave
these extensions for further research.
Appendix A
Letting ηts, ηtk and λt be the Lagrangianmultipliers on Eqs. (3), (4) and
(8) respectively, the ﬁrst order conditions are given by:
ct : ct−ϰct−1½ −γ−ϰβ 1þ gð Þ ctþ1−ϰct½ −γ ¼ λt ; ð13Þ
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ηst : 1þ gð Þstþ1 ¼ esist þ 1−δsð Þst ; ð20Þ
ηkt : 1þ gð Þktþ1 ¼ ekikt þ 1−δkð Þkt ; ð21Þ
λt : 1þ gð Þdt ¼ 1þ rt−1ð Þdt−1 þ ct þ ikt þ ACkt þ gt þ ist
þ ACst−ynt−yot−Tt : ð22Þ
At steady-state, we ﬁnd that:
c 1−ϰð Þ−γ 1−ϰβ 1þ gð Þ½  ¼ λ; ð23Þ
κg 1−ϰð Þ−γ 1−ϰβ 1þ gð Þ½  ¼ λ; ð24Þ
ekηk ¼ λ; ð25Þ
esηs ¼ λ; ð26Þ
1 ¼ β 1þ r þ π
ρ21
1−ρ3 þ ρ1−ρ2ð Þd½ 
" #
; ð27Þ
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; ð29Þ
s gþ δsð Þ ¼ esis; ð30Þ
k gþ δkð Þ ¼ ekik; ð31Þ
g−rð Þdþ yn þ yo þ T ¼ cþ ik þ g þ is: ð32Þ
Combining (23) and (24):
κ ¼ g
c

 γ
: ð33Þ
Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.10.005.
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